The Expected Shapley value on a class of probabilistic games
Sujata Gowala and
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We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exogenous probability of being realized. This probability distribution is known beforehand and the distribution of the expected worth needs to be done before the realization of the state. We obtain a value for this class of games and present three characterizations of this value using natural extensions of the axioms used in the seminal axiomatization of the Shapley value. The value, which we call the Expected Shapley value, allocates the players their expected worth with respect to a probability distribution.
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