The Disagreement Dividend

Giampaolo Bonomi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study how disagreement influences team performance in a dynamic game with positive production externalities. Players can hold different views about the productivity of the available production technologies. This disagreement results in different technology and effort choices -- "optimistic" views induce higher effort than "skeptical" views. Views are changed when falsified by evidence. With a single technology available, optimists exert more effort early on if the team also includes skeptics. With sufficiently strong externalities, a disagreeing team produces, on average, more than any like-minded team. With multiple technologies, disagreement over which technology works best motivates everyone to exert more effort.

Date: 2023-08, Revised 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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