Agree to Disagree: Measuring Hidden Dissent in FOMC Meetings

Kwok Ping Tsang and Zichao Yang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Using FOMC transcripts and customized deep learning models, we quantify ``hidden dissent'', or disagreement in the FOMC that is unobserved in formal votes. We find hidden dissent to be prevalent and systematically driven by macroeconomic conditions like inflation and unemployment. It strongly correlates with divergent member projections (SEP) and measures of policy sub-optimality, reflecting heterogeneity among members in policy preferences. Furthermore, we show that the financial markets respond to the hidden dissent implied in FOMC minutes.

Date: 2023-08, Revised 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cba and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2308.10131

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