Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment

Alvaro Forteza, Irene Mussio and Juan Pereyra ()

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Abstract: If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government's abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful.

Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment (2024)
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