Bespoke scapegoats: Scientific advisory bodies and blame avoidance in the Covid-19 pandemic and beyond

Roger Koppl, Kira Pronin, Nick Cowen, Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Pablo Paniagua Prieto

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Abstract: Scholars have not asked why so many governments created ad hoc scientific advisory bodies (ahSABs) to address the Covid-19 pandemic instead of relying on existing public health infrastructure. We address this neglected question with an exploratory study of the US, UK, Sweden, Italy, Poland, and Uganda. Drawing on our case studies and the blame-avoidance literature, we find that ahSABs are created to excuse unpopular policies and take the blame should things go wrong. Thus, membership typically represents a narrow range of perspectives. An ahSAB is a good scapegoat because it does little to reduce government discretion and has limited ability to deflect blame back to government. Our explanation of our deviant case of Sweden, that did not create and ahSAB, reinforces our general principles. We draw the policy inference that ahSAB membership should be vetted by the legislature to ensure broad membership.

Date: 2023-10, Revised 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-tra
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