Towards Replication-Robust Analytics Markets

Thomas Falconer, Jalal Kazempour and Pierre Pinson

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Despite recent advancements in machine learning, in practice, relevant datasets are often distributed among market competitors who are reluctant to share. To incentivize data sharing, recent works propose analytics markets, where multiple agents share features and are rewarded for improving the predictions of others. These rewards can be computed by treating features as players in a coalitional game, with solution concepts that yield desirable market properties. However, this setup incites agents to strategically replicate their data and act under multiple false identities to increase their own revenue and diminish that of others, limiting the viability of such markets in practice. In this work, we develop an analytics market robust to such strategic replication for supervised learning problems. We adopt Pearl's do-calculus from causal inference to refine the coalitional game by differentiating between observational and interventional conditional probabilities. As a result, we derive rewards that are replication-robust by design.

Date: 2023-10, Revised 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-gth
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