Credibility in Credence Goods Markets

Xiaoxiao Hu and Haoran Lei

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Abstract: An expert seller chooses an experiment to influence a client's purchasing decision, but may manipulate the experiment result for personal gain. When credibility surpasses a critical threshold, the expert chooses a fully-revealing experiment and, if possible, manipulates the unfavorable result. In this case, a higher credibility strictly benefits the expert, whereas the client never benefits from the expert's services. We also discuss policies regarding monitoring expert's disclosure and price regulation. When prices are imposed exogenously, monitoring disclosure does not affect the client's highest equilibrium value. A lower price may harm the client when it discourages the expert from disclosing information.

Date: 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2310.09544

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