Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules

Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan and Yingkai Li

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a sender-receiver model in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the information structure chosen by the sender and the realized signals. This framework captures applications where a decision-maker (the receiver) seeks advice from an interested party (the sender). In these applications, the receiver frequently faces uncertainty regarding the sender's preferences and the set of feasible information structures. Consequently, we adopt a unified robust analysis framework that includes the max-min utility, the min-max regret, and the min-max competitive ratio as special cases. We show that the optimal decision rule is always a quota rule.

Date: 2023-10, Revised 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules (2023)
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