Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules

Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan and Yingkai Li

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in advance, to a rule that maps the information of the sender into decisions---when the receiver knows neither the sender's true preferences nor the full range of information the sender could supply. To handle this dual uncertainty, we adopt a unified robust framework that nests max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max competitive ratio as special cases. Across all criteria, the same answer emerges: the optimal rule is always a quota rule.

Date: 2023-10, Revised 2026-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Managing persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules (2026)
Working Paper: Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules (2023)
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