Tractable Aggregation in Endogenous Network Formation Models

Jose M. Betancourt

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies the long-run properties of a stochastic best-response network formation model. Players stochastically meet and make decisions about changing the state of their relationship. I give sufficient conditions under which this game induces a reversible Markov process in the space of networks, and show that in this case the stationary distribution is given by a Gibbs measure with an associated aggregating function that depends on players' utilities. Reversibility also implies the existence of a potential for a deterministic version of the network formation game. Using the properties of the Gibbs measure I show that, in simple settings, the long-run behavior of the model for increasingly large networks is driven by a trade-off between player incentives and the exponentially increasing number of feasible networks. I use this framework to obtain network statistics for simple models of social media following and international trade.

Date: 2023-10, Revised 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-upt
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