Monotonicity Failure in Ranked Choice Voting -- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for 3-Candidate Elections

Rylie Weaver

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Ranked choice voting is vulnerable to monotonicity failure - a voting failure where a candidate is cost an election due to losing voter preference or granted an election due to gaining voter preference. Despite increasing use of ranked choice voting at the time of writing of this paper, the frequency of monotonicity failure is still a very open question. This paper builds on previous work to develop conditions which can be used to test if it's possible that monotonicity failure has happened in a 3-candidate ranked choice voting election.

Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.12988 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2310.12988

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().