Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules

Oguzhan Celebi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study the relationship between diversity preferences and the choice rules implemented by institutions, with a particular focus on the affirmative action policies. I characterize the choice rules that can be rationalized by diversity preferences and demonstrate that the recently rescinded affirmative action mechanism used to allocate government positions in India cannot be rationalized. I show that if institutions evaluate diversity without considering intersectionality of identities, their choices cannot satisfy the crucial substitutes condition. I characterize choice rules that satisfy the substitutes condition and are rationalizable by preferences that are separable in diversity and match quality domains.

Date: 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-mic
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