An Empirical Analysis of Participatory Budgeting in Amsterdam

Pelle Nelissen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Using data from 35 Participatory Budgeting instances in Amsterdam, we empirically compare two different Participatory Budgeting rules: the greedy cost welfare rule and the Method of Equal Shares. We quantify how proportional, equal and fair the rules are and conclude that, for a small price in total voter satisfaction, the Method of Equal Shares performs better on all notions of fairness studied. We further provide a popular and a visual explanation of the Method of Equal Shares.

Date: 2023-10
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