Resource Sharing in Energy Communities: A Cooperative Game Approach

Ahmed S. Alahmed and Lang Tong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We analyze the overall benefits of an energy community cooperative game under which distributed energy resources (DER) are shared behind a regulated distribution utility meter under a general net energy metering (NEM) tariff. Two community DER scheduling algorithms are examined. The first is a community with centrally controlled DER, whereas the second is decentralized letting its members schedule their own DER locally. For both communities, we prove that the cooperative game's value function is superadditive, hence the grand coalition achieves the highest welfare. We also prove the balancedness of the cooperative game under the two DER scheduling algorithms, which means that there is a welfare re-distribution scheme that de-incentivizes players from leaving the grand coalition to form smaller ones. Lastly, we present five ex-post and an ex-ante welfare re-distribution mechanisms and evaluate them in simulation, in addition to investigating the performance of various community sizes under the two DER scheduling algorithms.

Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-gth and nep-reg
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Published in 2024 IEEE PES General Meeting, Seattle, WA

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2311.18792

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