No Ascending Auction can find Equilibrium for SubModular valuations

Oren Ben-Zwi and Ilan Newman

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic complexity theory's assumption.

Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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