Dealer Strategies in Agent-Based Models

Wladimir Ostrovsky

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper explores the utility of agent-based simulations in realistically modelling market structures and sheds light on the nuances of optimal dealer strategies. It underscores the contrast between conclusions drawn from probabilistic modelling and agent-based simulations, but also highlights the importance of employing a realistic test bed to analyse intricate dynamics. This is achieved by extending the agent-based model for auction markets by \cite{Chiarella.2008} to include liquidity providers. By constantly and passively quoting, the dealers influence their own wealth but also have ramifications on the market as a whole and the other participating agents. Through synthetic market simulations, the optimal behaviour of different dealer strategies and their consequences on market dynamics are examined. The analysis reveals that dealers exhibiting greater risk aversion tend to yield better performance outcomes. The choice of quote sizes by dealers is strategy-dependent: one strategy demonstrates enhanced performance with larger quote sizes, whereas the other strategy show a better results with smaller ones. Increasing quote size shows positive influence on the market in terms of volatility and kurtosis with both dealer strategies. However, the impact stemming from larger risk aversion is mixed. While one of the dealer strategies shows no discernible effect, the other strategy results in mixed outcomes, encompassing both positive and negative effects.

Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-hme and nep-mst
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2312.05943

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