LQG Information Design

Masaki Miyashita and Takashi Ui

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper addresses information design with linear best responses of agents, quadratic objective functions of an information designer, and a payoff state distributed according to a Gaussian distribution. We formulate the problem as semidefinite programming (SDP) and use the duality principle to characterize an optimal information structure. There exists a Gaussian information structure that is optimal among all information structures. A necessary and sufficient condition for optimality is that the realizations of the induced action profile and a state satisfy linear constraints derived from the primal and dual SDP. As a result, an observed action profile typically reveals the true state even if individual agents have only partial knowledge. In symmetric network games, an optimal information structure inherits this symmetry, which facilitates the computation of an optimal information structure.

Date: 2023-12, Revised 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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