The cost of artificial latency in the PBS context

Umberto Natale and Michael Moser

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Abstract: We present a comprehensive analysis of the implications of artificial latency in the Proposer-Builder Separation framework on the Ethereum network. Focusing on the MEV-Boost auction system, we analyze how strategic latency manipulation affects Maximum Extractable Value yields and network integrity. Our findings reveal both increased profitability for node operators and significant systemic challenges, including heightened network inefficiencies and centralization risks. We empirically validates these insights with a pilot that Chorus One has been operating on Ethereum mainnet. We demonstrate the nuanced effects of latency on bid selection and validator dynamics. Ultimately, this research underscores the need for balanced strategies that optimize Maximum Extractable Value capture while preserving the Ethereum network's decentralization ethos.

Date: 2023-12, Revised 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net and nep-pay
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