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Leveraging IS and TC: Optimal order execution subject to reference strategies

Xue Cheng, Peng Guo and Tai-ho Wang

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Abstract: The paper addresses the problem of meta order execution from a broker-dealer's point of view in Almgren-Chriss model under execution risk. A broker-dealer agency is authorized to execute an order of trading on some client's behalf. The strategies that the agent is allowed to deploy is subject to a benchmark, referred to as the reference strategy, regulated by the client. We formulate the broker's problem as a utility maximization problem in which the broker seeks to maximize his utility of excess profit-and-loss at the execution horizon, of which optimal feedback strategies are obtained in closed form. In the absence of execution risk, the optimal strategies subject to reference strategies are deterministic. We establish an affine structure among the trading trajectories under optimal strategies subject to general reference strategies using implementation shortfall (IS) and target close (TC) orders as basis. Furthermore, an approximation theorem is proposed to show that with small error, general reference strategies can be approximated by piece-wise constant ones, of which the optimal strategy is piece-wise linear combination between IS and TC orders. We conclude the paper with numerical experiments illustrating the trading trajectories as well as histograms of terminal wealth and utility at investment horizon under optimal strategies versus those under TWAP strategies.

Date: 2024-01, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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