Incontestable Assignments

Benoit Decerf, Guillaume Haeringer and Martin Van der Linden

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study an information-based weakening of stability for school choice, using the evidence students may invoke in appeals. The model permits partial information about schools' choice functions and the realized assignment. A student has a legitimate complaint if, in every compatible state, she can block with some more-preferred school, and an assignment is incontestable if no student has such a complaint. We characterize legitimate complaints using an ex-post safety-set. For school-side information rules, under which the only admissible assignment-side information is the student's own assignment and all interim-compatible school-side states are preserved, incontestability is equivalent to respecting interim safety-sets. Stable mechanisms and Top Trading Cycles with responsive priorities are incontestable for every such rule. Pareto improvements preserve this robustness. When schools' choice functions are path-independent, all mechanisms that are incontestable for every school-side information rule, are non-wasteful, and guarantee group protection give each student the same attainable set conditional on her preferences and interim information.

Date: 2024-01, Revised 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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