Tournaments, Contestant Heterogeneity and Performance

Enzo Brox and Daniel Goller

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Tournaments are frequently used incentive mechanisms to enhance performance. In this paper, we use field data and show that skill disparities among contestants asymmetrically affect the performance of contestants. Skill disparities have detrimental effects on the performance of the lower-ability contestant but positive effects on the performance of the higher-ability contestant. We discuss the potential of different behavioral approaches to explain our findings and discuss the implications of our results for the optimal design of contests. Beyond that, our study reveals two important empirical results: (a) affirmative action-type policies may help to mitigate the adverse effects on lower-ability contestants, and (b) the skill level of potential future contestants in subsequent tournament stages can detrimentally influence the performance of higher-ability contestants but does not affect the lower-ability contestant.

Date: 2024-01, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-hrm
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