Unemployment Volatility: When Workers Pay Costs upon Accepting Jobs

Rich Ryan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: When a firm hires a worker, adding the new hire to payroll is costly. These costs reduce the amount of resources that can go to recruiting workers and amplify how unemployment responds to changes in productivity. Workers also incur up-front costs upon accepting jobs. Examples include moving expenses and regulatory fees. I establish that workers' costs lessen the response of unemployment to productivity changes and do not subtract from resources available for recruitment. The influence of workers' costs is bounded by properties of a matching function, which describes how job openings and unemployment produce hires. Using data on job finding that are adjusted for workers' transitions between employment and unemployment and for how the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey records hires, I estimate a bound that ascribes limited influence to workers' costs. The results demonstrate that costs paid by workers upon accepting jobs affect outcomes in the labor market (firms threaten workers with paying the up-front costs again if wage negotiations fail), but their influence on volatility is less important than firms' costs.

Date: 2024-01
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