An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching

Federico Echenique, Alejandro Robinson-Cort\'es and Leeat Yariv

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights emerge. First, stable outcomes are prevalent. Second, while centralized clearinghouses commonly aim at implementing extremal stable matchings, our decentralized markets most frequently culminate in the median stable matching. Third, preferences' cardinal representations impact the stable partners participants match with. Last, the dynamics underlying our results exhibit strategic sophistication, with agents successfully avoiding cycles of blocking pairs.

Date: 2024-01
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.10872 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching (2013)
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