Efficiency in random allocation with ordinal rules
Samson Alva,
Eun Jeong Heo and
Vikram Manjunath
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We study ordinal rules for allocating indivisible goods via lottery. Ordinality requires a rule to consider only how agents rank degenerate lotteries and may be necessitated by cognitive, informational, or as we show, incentive constraints. The limited responsiveness of ordinal rules to agents' preferences means that they can only satisfy welfare properties based on first order stochastic dominance, which is incomplete. We define a new efficiency concept for ordinal rules. While ordinality and efficiency together are incompatible with the usual notions of fairness and somewhat limit randomization, they do leave room for a rich class of rules. We demonstrate this through a characterization of all ordinal, efficient, strategy-proof, non-bossy, boundedly invariant, and neutral rules.
Date: 2024-01, Revised 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.11899 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2401.11899
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().