Local Diversity of Condorcet Domains

Alexander Karpov, Klas Markstr\"om, S{\o}ren Riis and Bei Zhou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a political axis. As a consequence it becomes interesting to measure how diverse the preferences in a well-behaved domain can be. In this paper we introduce an egalitarian approach to measuring preference diversity, focusing on the abundance of distinct suborders one subsets of the alternative. We provide a common generalisation of the frequently used concepts of ampleness and copiousness. We give a detailed investigation of the abundance for Condorcet domains. Our theorems imply a ceiling for the local diversity in domains on large sets of alternatives, which show that in this measure Black's single-peaked domain is in fact optimal. We also demonstrate that for some numbers of alternatives, there are Condorcet domains which have largest local diversity without having maximum order.

Date: 2024-01
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