Consumer-Optimal Segmentation in Multi-Product Markets
Dirk Bergemann,
Tibor Heumann and
Michael C. Wang
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We analyze how market segmentation affects consumer welfare when a monopolist can engage in both second-degree price discrimination (through product differentiation) and third-degree price discrimination (through market segmentation). We characterize the consumer-optimal market segmentation and show that it has several striking properties: (1) the market segmentation displays monotonicity$\unicode{x2014}$higher-value customers always receive higher quality product than lower-value regardless of their segment and across any segment; and (2) when aggregate demand elasticity exceeds a threshold determined by marginal costs, no segmentation maximizes consumer surplus. Our results demonstrate that strategic market segmentation can benefit consumers even when it enables price discrimination, but these benefits depend critically on demand elasticities and cost structures. The findings have implications for regulatory policy regarding price discrimination and market segmentation practices.
Date: 2024-01, Revised 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.12366 Latest version (application/pdf)
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Working Paper: Consumer-Optimal Segmentation in Multi-Product Markets (2024) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2401.12366
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