Arrow's single peaked domains, richness, and domains for plurality and the Borda count

Klas Markstr\"om, S{\o}ren Riis and Bei Zhou

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Abstract: In this paper we extend the study of Arrow's generalisation of Black's single-peaked domain and connect this to domains where voting rules satisfy different versions of independence of irrelevant alternatives. First we report on a computational generation of all non-isomorphic Arrow's single-peaked domains on $n\leq 9$ alternatives. Next, we introduce a quantitative measure of richness for domains, as the largest number $r$ such that every alternative is given every rank between 1 and $r$ by the orders in the domain. We investigate the richness of Arrow's single-peaked domains and prove that Black's single-peaked domain has the highest possible richness, but it is not the only domain which attains the maximum. After this we connect Arrow's single-peaked domains to the discussion by Dasgupta, Maskin and others of domains on which plurality and the Borda count satisfy different versions of Independence of Irrelevant alternatives (IIA). For Nash's version of IIA and plurality, it turns out the domains are exactly the duals of Arrow's single-peaked domains. As a consequence there can be at most two alternatives which are ranked first in any such domain. For the Borda count both Arrow's and Nash's versions of IIA lead to a maximum domain size which is exponentially smaller than $2^{n-1}$, the size of Black's single-peaked domain.

Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-inv and nep-mic
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