A Characterization of Optimal Queueing Regimes

Marco Scarsini and Eran Shmaya

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider an M/M/1 queueing model where customers can strategically decide to enter or leave the queue. We characterize the class of queueing regimes such that, for any parameters of the model, the socially efficient behavior is an equilibrium outcome.

Date: 2024-01, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.13812 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2401.13812

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().