Fukushima Nuclear Wastewater Discharge: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach to International and Domestic Interaction and Strategic Decision-Making

Mingyang Li, Han Pengsihua, Songqing Zhao, Zejun Wang, Limin Yang and Weian Liu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: On August 24, 2023, Japan controversially decided to discharge nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean, sparking intense domestic and global debates. This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategic dynamics between Japan, other countries, and the Japan Fisheries Association. By incorporating economic, legal, international aid, and environmental factors, the research identifies three evolutionarily stable strategies, analyzing them via numerical simulations. The focus is on Japan's shift from wastewater release to its cessation, exploring the myriad factors influencing this transition and their effects on stakeholders' decisions. Key insights highlight the need for international cooperation, rigorous scientific research, public education, and effective wastewater treatment methods. Offering both a fresh theoretical perspective and practical guidance, this study aims to foster global consensus on nuclear wastewater management, crucial for marine conservation and sustainable development.

Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.07210 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2402.07210

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().