Equitable screening

Filip Tokarski

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study the problem of a government providing benefits while considering the perceived equity of the resulting allocation. Such concerns are modeled through an equity constraint requiring that equally deserving agents receive equal allocations. I ask what forms of screening are compatible with equity and show that while the government cannot equitably screen with a single instrument (e.g. payments or wait times), combining multiple instruments, which on their own favor different groups, allows it to screen while still producing an equitable allocation.

Date: 2024-02, Revised 2024-06
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