Identification with Posterior-Separable Information Costs

Martin Bustos

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I provide a model of rational inattention with heterogeneity and prove it is observationally equivalent to a state-dependent stochastic choice model subject to attention costs. I demonstrate that additive separability of unobservable heterogeneity, together with an independence assumption, suffice for the empirical model to admit a representative agent. Using conditional probabilities, I show how to identify: how covariates affect the desirability of goods, (a measure of) welfare, factual changes in welfare, and bounds on counterfactual market shares.

Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
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