Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem

Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Sergiu Hart

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each provided good must justify its cost, leading to strong complementarities in the "preferences" of goods. Furthermore, goods that are in high demand given other already-provided goods must also be provided. The question of the existence of a stable solution (a menu of public goods to be provided) exhibits a rich combinatorial structure. We uncover sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for guaranteeing the existence of a stable solution, and derive both positive and negative results for strategyproof stable matching.

Date: 2024-02
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