Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality

Shangen Li

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions? This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a larger equilibrium externality, but never leaves the firm worse off. Consequently, mandating full disclosure is no different from maximizing the firm's private benefit while disregarding the ensuing externality. Transparency beyond binary disclosure is necessary only when the firm holds private information about its incentives for emission reduction. I provide conditions under which focusing on threshold disclosure policies entails no loss of generality.

Date: 2024-02, Revised 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.11961 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11961

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators (help@arxiv.org).