The Unelected Hand? Bureaucratic Influence and Electoral Accountability

Simon Lodato, Christos Mavridis and Federico Vaccari

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Abstract: What role do non-elected bureaucrats play when elections provide imperfect accountability and create incentives for pandering? We develop a model where politicians and bureaucrats interact to implement policy. Both can either be good, sharing the voters' preferences over policies, or bad, intent on enacting policies that favor special interests. Our analysis identifies the conditions under which good bureaucrats choose to support or oppose political pandering. When bureaucrats wield significant influence over policy decisions, good politicians lose their incentives to pander, a shift that ultimately benefits voters. An intermediate level of bureaucratic influence over policymaking can be voter-optimal: large enough to prevent pandering but small enough to avoid granting excessive influence to potentially bad bureaucrats.

Date: 2024-02, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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