Competing Mechanisms in Games Played Through Agents: Theory and Experiment
Seungjin Han and
Andrew Leal
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA), an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can offer any arbitrary mechanism that specifies a transfer schedule for each agent conditional on all Agents' messages. We identify the set of equilibrium allocations using deviator-reporting mechanisms (DRMs) on the path and single transfer schedules off the path. We design a lab experiment implementing DRMs. We observe that implemented outcomes are efficient more often than random. A majority of the time, Agents do tell the truth on the identity of a deviating Principal, despite potential gains from (tacit) collusion on false reports. As play progresses, Agents learn to play with their counterparty Agent with the average predicted probability of collusion on false reports across groups increasing from about 9% at the beginning of the experiment to just under 20% by the end. However, group heterogeneity is significant.
Date: 2024-03, Revised 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2403.03317
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