Artificial Bugs for Crowdsearch

Hans Gersbach, Fikri Pitsuwan () and Pio Blieske

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Bug bounty programs, where external agents are invited to search and report vulnerabilities (bugs) in exchange for rewards (bounty), have become a major tool for companies to improve their systems. We suggest augmenting such programs by inserting artificial bugs to increase the incentives to search for real (organic) bugs. Using a model of crowdsearch, we identify the efficiency gains by artificial bugs, and we show that for this, it is sufficient to insert only one artificial bug. Artificial bugs are particularly beneficial, for instance, if the designer places high valuations on finding organic bugs or if the budget for bounty is not sufficiently high. We discuss how to implement artificial bugs and outline their further benefits.

Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
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