Asset management with an ESG mandate

Michele Azzone, Emilio Barucci and Davide Stocco

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We investigate the portfolio frontier and risk premia in equilibrium when institutional investors aim to minimize the tracking error variance under an ESG score mandate. If a negative ESG premium is priced in the market, this mandate can reduce portfolio inefficiency when the return over-performance target is limited. In equilibrium, with asset managers endowed with an ESG mandate and mean-variance investors, a negative ESG premium arises. A result that is supported by empirical data. The negative ESG premium is due to the ESG constraint imposed on institutional investors and is not associated with a risk factor.

Date: 2024-03, Revised 2024-12
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