Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach

Pan-Yang Su, Chinmay Maheshwari, Victoria Tuck and Shankar Sastry

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The rise of advanced air mobility (AAM) is expected to become a multibillion-dollar industry in the near future. Market-based mechanisms are touted to be an integral part of AAM operations, which comprise heterogeneous operators with private valuations. In this work, we study the problem of designing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, operated by multiple operators each having heterogeneous valuations associated with their fleet, between vertiports, while enforcing the arrival, departure, and parking constraints at vertiports. Particularly, we propose an incentive-compatible and individually rational vertiport reservation mechanism that maximizes a social welfare metric, which encapsulates the objective of maximizing the overall valuations of all operators while minimizing the congestion at vertiports. Additionally, we improve the computational tractability of designing the reservation mechanism by proposing a mixed binary linear programming approach that leverages the network flow structure.

Date: 2024-03, Revised 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-reg and nep-tre
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