Dynamic Resource Allocation with Karma: An Experimental Study

Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani, Florian D\"orfler and Heinrich H. Nax

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We perform a behavioral experiment of karma, a class of mechanisms for repeated resource allocation with attractive fairness and efficiency properties, in theory. Individuals in these mechanisms bid non-tradable credits that flow from resource consumers to yielders. Human subjects recruited on Amazon MTurk are repeatedly and randomly paired to bid karma according to time-varying individual urgency to acquire resources. Treatments varied in the urgency process (frequent moderate versus sporadic high urgency) and the richness of the bidding scheme (binary versus full range). Benchmarked against random allocation, karma achieves an (almost) Pareto improvement, despite subjects deviating from the theoretically optimal Nash bidding policy: maximum improvement is attained by subjects deviating by up to one karma bid unit on average, and positive improvement with deviations of up to 3-4 units. These findings hold across all treatments, among which no significant differences are found, with the exception of the sporadic high urgency process with binary bidding being (weakly) favorable. They offer behaviorally robust lower bounds for karma's expected performance in human populations and guide its future implementation.

Date: 2024-04, Revised 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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