Long run consequence of p-hacking

Xuanye Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the theoretical consequence of p-hacking on the accumulation of knowledge under the framework of mis-specified Bayesian learning. A sequence of researchers, in turn, choose projects that generate noisy information in a field. In choosing projects, researchers need to carefully balance as projects generates big information are less likely to succeed. In doing the project, a researcher p-hacks at intensity $\varepsilon$ so that the success probability of a chosen project increases (unduly) by a constant $\varepsilon$. In interpreting previous results, researcher behaves as if there is no p-hacking because the intensity $\varepsilon$ is unknown and presumably small. We show that over-incentivizing information provision leads to the failure of learning as long as $\varepsilon\neq 0$. If the incentives of information provision is properly provided, learning is correct almost surely as long as $\varepsilon$ is small.

Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm and nep-sog
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