Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms

Alexander Brown, Daniel G. Stephenson and Rodrigo A. Velez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper experimentally evaluates four mechanisms intended to achieve the Uniform outcome in rationing problems (Sprumont, 1991). Our benchmark is the dominant-strategy, direct-revelation mechanism of the Uniform rule. A strategically equivalent mechanism that provides non-binding feedback during the reporting period greatly improves performance. A sequential revelation mechanism produces modest improvements despite not possessing dominant strategies. A novel, obviously strategy-proof mechanism, devised by Arribillaga et al. (2023), does not improve performance. We characterize each alternative to the direct mechanism, finding general lessons about the advantages of real-time feedback and sequentiality of play as well as the potential shortcomings of an obviously strategy-proof mechanism.

Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.11883 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2404.11883

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().