Optimal Refund Mechanism with Consumer Learning

Qianjun Lyu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer can privately acquire information about his valuation of a product over time. We consider a class of refund mechanisms based on stochastic return policies: if the buyer requests a return, the seller will issue a (partial) refund while allowing the buyer to keep the product with some probability. Such return policies can affect the buyer's learning process and thereby influence the return rate. Nevertheless, we show that the optimal refund mechanism is deterministic and takes a simple form: either the seller offers a sufficiently low price and disallows returns to deter buyer learning, or she offers a sufficiently high price with free returns to implement maximal buyer learning. The form of the optimal refund mechanism is non-monotone in the buyer's prior belief regarding his valuation.

Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
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