Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents

Mehmet Ekmekci, Lucas Maestri and Dong Wei

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and limited commitment. A principal seeks to screen efficient agents using one-period contracts, but is tempted to revise contract terms upon knowing an agent's type. Alterations of contracts are observable and, hence, whenever past promises are broken future information revelation stops. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which information revelation can be fostered. For sufficiently patient players, private information is either never revealed or fully revealed in a sequential manner. Optimal contracts provide high-powered incentives upon initial disclosure of an agent's type, and rewards for information revelation vanish over time.

Date: 2024-05, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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