Data-Driven Monitoring and Deterrence in a Changing Environment

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim and Konrad Mierendorff

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Abstract: We study a dynamic model in which a principal monitors agents based on historical data of infractions. This data informs when and at what intensity to monitor; the monitoring decision, in turn, selects the collected data, shaping the principal's future learning. We analyze this feedback loop using a bandit model in which the underlying monitoring environment evolves according to a hidden Markov process. Because data collection is endogenous, how the principal uses this information is critical: surprisingly, a myopic approach renders historical data completely valueless. By endogenizing the agent's incentives, we demonstrate that the principal's purely informational motive to explore serves as an endogenous commitment device. This inherent drive to gather data compels persistent vigilance, strictly lowering the equilibrium infraction rate and restoring the power of deterrence.

Date: 2024-05, Revised 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
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