The Logic of Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Causal Inference

Hanti Lin

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The 2021 Nobel Prize in Economics recognized an epistemology of causal inference based on the Rubin causal model (Rubin 1974), which merits broader attention in philosophy. This model, in fact, presupposes a logical principle of counterfactuals, Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM), the locus of a pivotal debate between Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) on the semantics of counterfactuals. Proponents of CEM should recognize that this connection points to a new argument for CEM -- a Quine-Putnam indispensability argument grounded in the Nobel-winning applications of the Rubin model in health and social sciences. To advance the dialectic, I challenge this argument with an updated Rubin causal model that retains its successes while dispensing with CEM. This novel approach combines the strengths of the Rubin causal model and a causal model familiar in philosophy, the causal Bayes net. The takeaway: deductive logic and inductive inference, often studied in isolation, are deeply interconnected.

Date: 2024-05, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.11284 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2405.11284

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().