Learning and Communication Towards Unanimous Consent

Yingkai Li and Boli Xu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn about the state and then communicate with the agent, but has limited commitment, as she may misreport her findings. We show that limited commitment makes binary tests optimal. Moreover, when players' preferences are positively aligned, the optimal test is a threshold test. When their preferences are negatively aligned, the optimal test is either an interval test or a tail test, depending on the agent's relative risk attitude. Additionally, the principal can benefit from screening the agent through a menu of tests, which admits a simple structure regardless of the complexity of the agent's type space.

Date: 2024-05, Revised 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ppm
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