Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism

Jiarui Xie

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the tiered deferred acceptance mechanism used in school admissions, such as in China and Turkey. This mechanism partitions schools into tiers and applies the deferred acceptance algorithm within each tier. Once assigned, students cannot apply to schools in subsequent tiers. We show that this mechanism is not strategy-proof. In the induced preference revelation game, we find that merging tiers preserves all equilibrium outcomes, and within-tier acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the mechanism to implement stable matchings. We also find that introducing tiers to the deferred acceptance mechanism may not improve student quality at top-tier schools as intended.

Date: 2024-06, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.00455 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2406.00455

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().