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Efficiency in Pure-Exchange Economies with Risk-Averse Monetary Utilities

Mario Ghossoub and Michael Boyuan Zhu

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Abstract: We study Pareto efficiency in a pure-exchange economy where agents' preferences are represented by risk-averse monetary utilities. These coincide with law-invariant monetary utilities, and they can be shown to correspond to the class of monotone, (quasi-)concave, Schur concave, and translation-invariant utility functionals. This covers a large class of utility functionals, including a variety of law-invariant robust utilities. We show that Pareto optima exist and are comonotone, and we provide a crisp characterization thereof in the case of law-invariant positively homogeneous monetary utilities. This characterization provides an easily implementable algorithm that fully determines the shape of Pareto-optimal allocations. In the special case of law-invariant comonotone-additive monetary utility functionals (concave Yaari-Dual utilities), we provide a closed-form characterization of Pareto optima. As an application, we examine risk-sharing markets where all agents evaluate risk through law-invariant coherent risk measures, a widely popular class of risk measures. In a numerical illustration, we characterize Pareto-optimal risk-sharing for some special types of coherent risk measures.

Date: 2024-06, Revised 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-inv, nep-opm and nep-upt
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