Network Threshold Games
Alastair Langtry,
Sarah Taylor and
Yifan Zhang
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours choose action 1. We propose a transformation of the network that `absorbs' the heterogeneity in thresholds into the network. This allows us to characterise equilibria in terms of the k-core -- a well-studied measure of network cohesiveness -- of the transformed network. Our model is also the direct analogy to the workhorse model of Ballester et al. (2006) when actions are 0 or 1. Further, our binary action version exhibits a remarkable stability property. When agents have linear-quadratic preferences, the k-core of the transformed network characterises the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential move version of the game -- no matter what order agents move in.
Date: 2024-06, Revised 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2406.04540
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