Learning about informativeness

Wanying Huang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study whether individuals can learn the informativeness of their information technology through social learning. As in the classic sequential social learning model, rational agents arrive in order and make decisions based on the past actions of others and their private signals. There is uncertainty regarding the informativeness of the common signal-generating process. We show that learning in this setting is not guaranteed, and depends crucially on the relative tail distributions of private beliefs induced by uninformative and informative signals. We identify the phenomenon of perpetual disagreement as the cause of learning and characterize learning in the canonical Gaussian environment.

Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.05299 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2406.05299

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().