Learning about informativeness
Wanying Huang
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We study a sequential social learning model in which there is uncertainty about the informativeness of a common signal-generating process. Rational agents arrive in order and make decisions based on the past actions of others and their private signals. We show that, in this setting, asymptotic learning about informativeness is not guaranteed and depends crucially on the relative tail distributions of the private beliefs induced by uninformative and informative signals. We identify the phenomenon of perpetual disagreement as the cause of learning and characterize learning in the canonical Gaussian environment.
Date: 2024-06, Revised 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.05299 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2406.05299
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().