The Limits of Interval-Regulated Price Discrimination

Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen and Renzhe Xu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, we study third-degree price discrimination in a model first presented in Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris [2015]. Since such price discrimination might create market segments with vastly different posted prices, we consider regulating these prices, specifically, via restricting them to lie within an interval. Given a price interval, we consider segmentations of the market where a seller, who is oblivious to the existence of such regulation, still posts prices within the price interval. We show the following surprising result: For any market and price interval where such segmentation is feasible, there is always a different segmentation that optimally transfers all excess surplus to the consumers. In addition, we characterize the entire space of buyer and seller surplus that are achievable by such segmentation, including maximizing seller surplus, and simultaneously minimizing buyer and seller surplus.

Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-reg
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